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Abstract—Some cleanup decisions, such as cleanup of intractable contaminated sites or disposal of spent nuclear fuel, have 
proven difficult to make.  Such decisions face high resistance to agreement from stakeholders possibly because they do not 
trust the decision makers, view the consequences of being wrong as too high, etc.  Our project’s goal is to improve science-
based cleanup decision-making.  This includes diagnosing intractable situations, as a step to identifying a path toward 
sustainable solutions.  Companion papers describe the underlying philosophy of the KONVERGENCE Model for 
Sustainable Decisions,1 and the overall framework and process steps.2 Where knowledge, values, and resources converge 
(the K, V, and R in KONVERGENCE), you will find a sustainable decision – a decision that works over time. For intractable 
cases, serious consideration of the adaptable class of alternatives is warranted – if  properly implemented and packaged.
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are many intractable cleanup problems, 
including complex, contaminated areas at government and 
private sites.  Cleanup issues typically result from past 
decisions that were considered acceptable at the time by 
those involved, with the knowledge, resources, and 
regulations (if any) of the time.  (In our model, 
regulations are an imperfect manifestation of values.1, 2)
We agree with the quote attributed to A. Einstein, 
“Problems cannot be solved at the same level of 
awareness that created them.”  Our goal is better, 
participatory science-based decision-making. 
The suggestions in this paper were developed during 
the first half of a 3-year research project.  We offer these 
ideas to solicit feedback and continue progress.  You may 
find it helpful to read the companion papers on 
framework2 and then the underlying philosophy1 before 
this paper.  In the second half of our project, we will 
further refine and test ideas.  This is a research project 
and does not represent official positions of the 
Department of Energy or its contractors. 
Our approach is based on the need to establish and 
maintain konvergence among the three universes of 
knowledge, values of those affected by a decision, and 
available resources.  We call this the KONVERGENCE
Model for Sustainable Decisions.1,2  Investigation and 
availability of data defines knowledge.  Participation of 
stakeholders specifies values.  The availability of budgets, 
offsite waste disposal sites, etc. drives resources.
Acceptable alternatives are those in the konvergence of 
knowledge, values, and resources.  Konvergence must be 
maintained as the universes change if the decision is to 
remain acceptable.  Some past decisions to bury waste 
appear to have drifted out of konvergence; such cases 
have become cleanup challenges.  Although we were 
initially focused on the relatively tractable set of facility 
decommissioning decisions, our analyses and approach 
offer constructive suggestions for the most intractable of 
cleanup problems and even spent fuel disposition.  We 
use the Yucca Mtn case to make several points below 
because the issues are well known. 
Consider these characteristics of intractable cases. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The hazards will persist for centuries or millennia; 
humans have little experience in deliberately making 
decisions with such time horizons, and even less 
experience in making successful ones.  
Lack of trust is clearly an issue (within the values
universe). 
Knowledge of how solutions will behave for such 
time horizons is lacking. 
Provision of resources for long time frames is 
needed. 
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Attempt brute force to 
overcome barrier
(resistance to making the
decision)
Split single decision into network of 
staged decisions, earning trust and
gaining knowledge along the way.
Lower barrier (resistance) by reducing
consequences of being wrong by making
the decision less irreversible.
Figure 1. Making decisions easier by reducing the consequences of being wrong or by splitting a single decision into a
network of decisions
One cause of difficulty in making long-lasting
decisions is the way we approach them.  Figure 1 shows a 
chemical reaction analogy.  The typical way we try to
make controversial decisions is to attempt brute force to
overcome resistance. Yet, in democratic societies,
resistance can generally react to such brute force. We
then get a force-resistance battle, stalling a decision, while
the original problem remains.  Perhaps it would be useful
to break the single tough reaction (decision) into stages or 
reduce resistance by reducing the consequences of being 
wrong (more reversible thermodynamics).
II. CLASSES OF ALTERNATIVES 
We characterize alternatives by the variables of
hazard (longevity, severity, etc.) and adaptability of 
solutions (figure 2).  “Adaptability” encompasses
reversibility (implies going back to the starting point),
repairability, fixability (implies only patching the current
approach), and flexibility.
Figure 2.  Hazard-Adaptability Space
Three hazard-adaptability regions or classes are:
• Reusable - Relatively low hazard, variable
adaptability - Facility can be released for other
purposes, by other groups – with or without
restrictions on use.  If any use of the facility/land
would lead to acceptable risk, the release is 
“unrestricted”, e.g., greenfield.  If some uses would
pose unacceptable risks, the release is “restricted”,
e.g., brownfield sites.
• Closed - Relatively high hazard, relatively low 
adaptability - Facility is put into a state with little
adaptability, with little or no intention to revisit later.
Examples include so-called “entombed” facilities or
deep waste disposal sites after the facility is sealed.
• Adaptable - Relatively high hazard, relatively high 
adaptability - Facility is kept in an adaptable state,
thereby keeping future options open while keeping
the risk from hazards acceptable to stakeholders.
Examples include the concept of “assured storage” or
“assured isolation” of low-level radioactive waste,3, 4
the Hanford C reactor, temporary spent fuel storage
at commercial power plants, and the National
Research Council’s suggestion for adaptive staged
decisions at Yucca Mtn.5, 6
III. REUSABLE ALTERNATIVES
There is no alternative class that works best for all 
cleanup problems.  Consider the reusable class of 
alternatives.  If we know how to cleanup a site
(knowledge) and have the resources to do so (budget and
place to send resulting waste) this solution is usually 
implemented because such cleanup is generally consistent 
with values.  The pace of cleanup is typically controlled
by budgets, which result from value-based prioritization
of various needs. (Values manifest themselves
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Hazard severity and longevity (not risk)
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imperfectly in political decisions and in the rules and
regulations of the moment.1)
Consider cases where one of the above conditions is 
not met.  For example, reusable alternatives may be
within the values universe but not within knowledge (lack 
of confidence in the technology to remove or destroy the
hazards) or resources (no offsite waste disposal,
inadequate budget).  Consider spent nuclear fuel as an
example – there is no current method to destroy the
hazard and no place to permanently place it.  Other
examples are heavily contaminated sites for which no 
technology exists that allows cleanup at acceptable levels
of risk and cost (knowledge and/or resource problems).
Then, figure 3 shows how critics might view reusable
alternatives.  The universes of knowledge, resources, and
values are each represented by a circle. The black circle 
shows that under these circumstances reusable
alternatives would be consistent with values but possibly
not with knowledge and resources, it lies at or outside of 
the knowledge and resource circles. Advocates may view
things differently.  Our hypothesis is that an alternative
will not be acceptable over time if it is not in the
KONVERGENCE area of the diagram, i.e. consistent with 
all three universes.
Values
Resources
Knowledge
KONVERGENCE
Figure 3.  Reusable alternatives with knowledge and
resource concerns
IV. CLOSED ALTERNATIVES 
Next consider closed alternatives.  Grouting is one
common technology. It is generally known how to fill a 
facility or waste site with grout, yet long-term barrier
behavior may not be adequately understood. Offsite
waste disposal is not needed, removing one resource
constraint.  (But it does require a new resource constraint,
long-term land use.)  Budget is typically available.  Such
alternatives are generally consistent with resources and 
partially consistent with knowledge.
What about values? We posit a generic hierarchy of
4 values (equality, democracy, truth, reason) and 20
principles, to be rechecked for any specific problem.2  If 
the hazards are recognized as relatively low and short-
lived, a closed alternative is often acceptable. However,
if “permanent” closure is viewed as posing substantial
risk to future generations, it can run afoul of several
principles under the equality value (decisions are just for
current and future generations):
Trustee Principle – “Every generation has
obligations as trustee to protect the interests of future
generations.”7
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Sustainability Principle – “No generation should
deprive future generations of the opportunity for a 
quality of life comparable to its own.” 7
Precautionary Principle 1 – “Actions that pose a
realistic threat of irreversible harm or catastrophic
consequences should not be pursued unless there is
some compelling countervailing need to benefit
either current or future generations.” 7
Complying with regulations may be inadequate to
convince opponents that permanent closure decisions are
consistent with their values. Examples include closure of
sites with significant levels of long-lived hazards and
“permanent” storage of spent nuclear fuel.  The U.S. has
existed for less time than such hazards will last; people
intuitively doubt whether regulations and associated
implementing authorities offer adequate protection for 
centuries.  Our first 42 presidents had average terms of 
about 5 years. Thus, a waste disposal site to operate for
1,000 years spans about 200 U.S. presidential
administrations.  Research indicates that it is not just an
issue of trust; survey participants recognized that there are
limits to knowledge for such time horizons.8
One difficulty is inconsistency in time horizon among
regulations, which inhibits having a clear dialogue and
societal approach to long-term hazards, especially for 
contaminated sites involving multiple types of hazards.
Consider the following range of regulatory time horizons.
10,000 years - Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
EPA regulations for high-level and transuranic waste
(10CFR60, 10CFR63, 40CFR191, 40CFR197).
1,000 years – EPA regulations for near-surface
uranium and thorium mill tailings (40CFR192) and
DOE policy for new land burial (DOE M 435.1).
500 years – NRC regulations for near-surface burial
of low-level waste (10CFR61).
30 years – baseline EPA RCRA time period for near-
surface burial chemical hazards (40CFR264); EPA
can increase or decrease this value for each case.
Indefinite – baseline EPA CERCLA time period for 
residual hazards. CERCLA requires a 5-year review
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to ensure the remedy is still protective of human
health and the environment and is still performing as 
predicted. We are not aware of a CERCLA remedy
designed to operate for millennia.
These differences are not directly related to the longevity
of the hazards, as pointed out by Okrent9 and Kadak.10
For example, toxic metals do not decay significantly, yet 
they are regulated for orders of magnitude less time than
radiological hazards, which do decay significantly.  This
situation can create conflict between short-time-horizon
regulations and intergenerational values.
When critics view closed alternatives as having
adequate resources, but also having gaps in knowledge of
long-term behavior and inadequate attention to
intergenerational values, they are viewing closed
alternatives as shown in figure 4. Advocates may view 
things differently.  Indeed, advocates can be correct in 
saying that a closed alternative is consistent with a short-
term regulation (e.g. 30 years).  The underlying problem
is that regulations and values are not always in harmony;
our model considers regulations as an imperfect overlay
of values; eventually the differences should decrease.1 If
so, a solution consistent with regulations today may
become divergent with values and regulations later. 
Values
Resources
Knowledge
KONVERGENCE
Figure 4. Closed alternatives with values and
knowledge concerns
There are many non-DOE sites already closed with
residual hazards in place where the long-term solution
may not perform adequately for the duration of the
hazards.  If so, those solutions may drift out of 
konvergence and new cleanup challenges will arise. 
V. NO ACTION IS DANGEROUS,
WRONG ACTION IS DANGEROUS
In such situations, figures 3 and 4 show that neither
reusable nor closed alternatives are in konvergence. A
polarized situation has developed. Even if such a reusable
or closed alternative is selected, the longevity of the
decision is suspect.
Those favoring the reusable and closed classes of 
alternatives may not talk the same language.  Those
supporting closed alternatives may believe the problem is 
only that opponents are not listening to their knowledge.
Those opposed may understand the technical arguments
but be unconvinced about the certainty of protection over
the duration of hazards.  This pattern appears for many
closed alternative cases including buried waste and spent
fuel disposition.
Those supporting reusable alternatives may believe
that others simply do not share their values; yet people
can share such values but realize that the reusable
alternatives run afoul of technical and budget limitations.
Again, the same pattern appears in many cases. 
In such polarized situations, parties often seek
advantage through legal-regulatory procedures.
In such cases, neither reusable nor closed alternatives
can be implemented. Or, if they are implemented, they 
are unlikely to be sustained unless the knowledge, values,
and resource universe change so that the decision comes
into konvergence later. 
Until a reusable or closed alternative comes into
konvergence, something must be done with the hazards.
If the hazard is not stable or its protective barriers are
degrading or already inadequate, the worst action is “no
action”. For siting decisions, the “no action” alternative 
is often safe. But, in unsiting decisions, when the hazards
already exist, legal-regulatory stalemate causing “no
action” can be dangerous. It runs afoul of Precautionary
Principle 2 – “Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, scientific uncertainty shall not be
used to postpone cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.”11
VI. WHAT CAN BE DONE?
We suggest combining step-wise adaptable solutions
with sincere, diligent efforts to increase the likelihood that 
reusable and/or closed alternatives may enter konvergence
in the future.  Plans to increase the range of future options
are needed to prevent those advocating reusable or closed
alternatives viewing step-wise approaches as a sham.
Said another way, if there is no plan B, then everyone
recognizes that all efforts are devoted to forcing plan A to
work.  This means we need a package:
• Proceed in a step-wise decision network fashion.  Put 
the hazards/facility into a configuration where they
are safe, at least temporarily, maintaining maximum
adaptability.
• Research better ways to cleanup (or at least reduce)
the hazard, to possibly bring reusable alternatives
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into konvergence.  For existing intractable waste 
sites, this includes research into decommissioning 
and cleanup technologies.  For spent nuclear fuel, the 
volume of long-term waste can conceivably be 
reduced orders of magnitude by separating long-lived 
isotopes and separately storing short-lived isotopes.  
The long-term hazard could be conceivably reduced, 
subject to values issues, by reusing useful long-lived 
isotopes (reprocessing) or burning them in reactors.  
Accelerator transmutation of waste (ATW) may also 
be helpful if technical and cost issues can be 
overcome. 
• Improve understanding of multi-generational risks, to 
possibly bring closed alternatives into konvergence.  
Improve monitoring of hazards that have already 
been put into closed or closed-like configurations.  
For example, if spent fuel were loaded into Yucca 
Mtn, study how the system performs for hundreds of 
years before further reducing adaptability.  Where 
waste is left in existing intractable waste sites, 
conduct the research needed to substantially improve 
understanding of long-term risk. 
All parts are needed.  If, for example, efforts that 
might bring reusable alternatives into konvergence in the 
future is left out, then people will conclude that the only 
long-term solution will be a closed one and that delay is 
only that – there is inadequate possibility of a different 
“end state,” only a slower path in getting there. 
VII. DYNAMIC NOT STATIC ANALYSES 
Long-duration problems require dynamic analysis, 
examining how things may change.  The solution and/or 
the three universes of knowledge, values, and resources
may change.  The three universes themselves interact. 
For example, sustained changes in values leads to 
changes in available resources.  The response time varies 
according to the resource in question.  Opening a new 
waste disposal site (a resource for an existing 
contaminated site) takes time.  Sustained allocation of 
resources to research can increase knowledge.  Increased 
knowledge can change values or the relative weights 
among values.  The events of 9/11/2001 and the 
realization of the threat of terrorism changed values.
Sustained changes in values also lead to changes in rules 
and regulations. 
VIII. CHARACTERISTICS NEEDED FOR 
ADAPTABLE NETWORKED ALTERNATIVES 
To be effective, adaptable, networked alternatives 
must have certain characteristics, including the following: 
(1) Minimize the chance of getting stalled at an 
intermediate point out of konvergence.  Start by 
defining the network of related points.  We characterize 
relationships as either staged or linked.
An adaptable approach implies a network of staged
decisions - a path of related decisions that must be 
completed before going to the next one.  Each staged 
decision must be in konvergence before taken.  The 
network can be very simple – a decision today to establish 
an adaptable configuration leading to a second decision 
some years later (or triggered by some event) at which 
time a selection between reusable or closed alternatives 
would be made.  This is envisioned for the C reactor at 
Hanford.  Or, the network may be quite complex.  (Other 
situations also create decision networks, such as when a 
key assumption cannot be validated nor R&D results 
obtained until later.) 
We define links as series of smaller, shorter-term 
actions or decisions that are taken to implement staged 
decisions.  Individual links may not be in konvergence, it 
is not important that they be so since they are shorter-
term.  Stakeholders will tolerate a set of linked steps to 
get to the next staged decision that is in konvergence.  If 
there is a reasonable chance of being stopped at an 
intermediate link along the path, then it is important to 
think about contingencies that would be in konvergence.  
One does not start a set of linked decisions unless it can 
be finished within the window of stakeholders’ tolerance. 
Consider the steps in moving spent fuel from its 
current location to Yucca Mountain (above ground), then 
into the mountain, then someday sealing (closing) the 
disposal facility.  To the extent possible, we should 
minimize the chance of shipments getting stalled at the 
above ground receiving station.  Even worse would be 
shipments stalled in transit to Yucca Mountain. 
(2) For intermediate points with a significant 
chance of being divergent, consider what might be 
necessary to move to a point in konvergence.  This is 
part of the definition of what it takes to be adaptable.  
Adaptability assessments should include the financial cost 
needed to move from the possibly divergent point to one 
that may be in konvergence.  This is not a “sunk cost” 
assessment unless the best path toward konvergence is 
back along the path to the starting point (merely reversing 
the action).  For grouted waste in place, the adaptability 
cost could include the cost of cutting and removing the 
grouted waste.  Or, it may be the cost to add additional 
barriers if the initial barriers have failed.  This should be 
tempered with an assessment of the probability of finding 
that an intermediate point is divergent.
An analogy may be helpful.  Consider a decision as a 
mass connected to the konvergence area by a spring.  As 
the mass becomes further out of konvergence because the 
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universes move, the force trying to pull the mass back to
konvergence increases.  The mass (inertia) represents the
adaptability of the implemented decision; the friction
coefficient represents decision processes. If restoration of
konvergence is resisted too long, then when change 
eventually happens, there can be an overcorrection. The
decision mass can overshoot the konvergence zone.
Consider long-lived buried waste.  The decision to 
put it there was in konvergence with the values of those
involved with the decision at the time.  In some cases, that 
decision is now divergent.  Where it is relatively easy
(low adaptability pain, responsive decision processes) to
adjust that decision, such adjustments are typically done.
Where adjustments are not so easy, e.g. costing billions of
dollars and requiring offsite waste disposal options that do
not yet exist (two resource constraints), adjustments are 
understandably resisted because the “obvious” alternative
(full retrieval) is itself not in konvergence. Yet, the
current decision (black circle in figure 5) is drifting
further out of konvergence, with force building toward
full retrieval (gray circle). 
Values
Resources
Knowledge
KONVERGENCE
Figure 5.  Pressure builds to move a divergent point
back to konvergence or beyond
(3) Assess how risk, cost, and other key
parameters vary with time. If hazards are to be left for
significant time, there will be some barriers to further
prevent or mitigate any spread of contamination.
Consider risk as the hazard divided by barrier
effectiveness.  We know how radioactive hazards change
with time; time dependence of chemical hazards may be 
uncertain.  The barrier degradation may also be poorly
known over the lifetime of the hazards in question.
It is relatively safe to wait (Table I) if the existing
barrier is slowly degrading while the hazards are quickly
decaying; it is also often advantageous because letting the
hazard decay in place probably reduces worker risk to 
treat or remove it and public risk to move it. 
Sometimes people cannot agree on the absolute risk posed
by an existing hazardous site.  In such cases it may still be 
possible to agree on what conditions and actions lead to
relative risk reduction.  Risk is always decreasing if the
absolute value of ǻH/H > ǻB/B and exposure scenarios
remain constant.
Table I. Relative urgency to take action
Hazard decay rate
Low High
High Dangerous to
wait
Existing
barrier
decay
rate
Low Relatively safe to
wait
(4) Consider adaptability as one of the desirable
attributes to optimize, along with cost, risk, and
others. In generating a network of possible stages,
leading ultimately to reusable or closed alternatives
(perhaps very far into the future), consider dynamic
tradeoffs among risk, cost, adaptability, etc. 
For example, Newberry, Kerr, and Leroy have
published a series of articles on the “assured isolation” of
low-level radioactive waste (originally called assured
storage).3,4  Assured isolation is defined as “an integrated
management system for safely isolating waste, while
preserving options for its long-term management,
through: robust, accessible facilities; planned preventive
maintenance; and sureties adequate to address
contingencies or implement future alternatives.”3 An
assured isolation facility is specifically intended to be
adaptable as contemplated by our definition “…the waste 
would remain in a retrievable condition that would not
foreclose options for future generations to remove the 
waste for recycling, repackaging, treatment, or disposal as 
new technologies become available.”4  The assured
isolation concept also specifically acknowledges,
however, that “if a facility succeeds in safely isolating the
waste over centuries, the site operator and regulator of
that future time might evaluate the facility’s performance
and decide to curtail or discontinue active institutional
controls.  Some or all of the waste units may finally be
backfilled and closed.  Our descendants will have
professional judgment at least equal to ours, actual
empirical data with which to evaluate future performance,
and much better predictive techniques.”4
For another example, Flüeler12 has ordered various
Yucca Mountain suggestions:
• “Nuclear Guardianship” (above ground)
• “Monitored retrievable storage” (above ground)
• “Underground retrievable storage”
• “Underground retrievable disposal”
• “Extended” final disposal or “monitored long-term
geological disposal”
• “Final disposal”
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from high to low “control intervention.”  This is similar to
our adaptability dimension in so far as higher “control
intervention” means increased ability to adapt (control)
the current situation to fix a problem.  He notes that the
ordering of these suggestions reverses for passive
protection. This spectrum of suggestions would similarly
align along the right edge of our figure 2.  He finds
“monitored long-term geological disposal” as particularly
robust.  “In general, a system is robust if it is not sensitive
to significant parameter changes; and most arguments,
evidence, social alignments, interests, and cultural values
lead to a consistent option.”12 This idea is to emplace the 
waste, establish co-located research facilities, and
maintain waste retrievability if research does not tend to 
validate predictive performance models. We describe this
as having only modest adaptability because the large costs
of emplacing wastes would have already been incurred
and it lacks a provision for plan B, if plan A diverges.
Consider figure 6.  The upper line represents a path
of stages that initially lose relatively little adaptability
concurrent with major risk reduction.  The lower path
loses significant adaptability first, with most risk 
reduction occurring later. The upper path is often
preferable; other matters such as time scale and the 
absolute value of risk are important. For example, it may
be preferable to reduce risk quickly (even with loss of
adaptability) if the risk is significant and would otherwise
persist for centuries.  The point is to examine how various
characteristics (including adaptability) vary as the
network unfolds.
Figure 6.  Possible Adaptability-Risk Paths
One can create similar diagrams for other variables,
including financial cost/risk and cost/adaptability
(5) Explicitly discuss the risk of being divergent at
intermediate points, the level of adaptability, and 
tradeoffs among adaptability, risk, cost, etc. with those
affected by the decision.  The more transparent, open,
complete, the discussion is, the better.
Decisions cannot be made and sustained without
agreement with values.  One element of values is trust.
Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther13 have studied the level of
support for siting a prison, landfill, hazardous waste 
incinerator, or high-level nuclear waste repository as a
function of trust, perceived risk, and various benefits
(both financial and safety, such as increased local control, 
oversight, etc.)  Table II summarizes some of their results.
Table II.  Interaction among trusts and perceived risk
in predicting support for an action13
Risk
Low High
High Hard-core
supporters
Movable
Trust
Low Movable Hard-core
opponents
The concepts of “perceived value and/or threat” and 
“personal inconvenience costs” suggest when and how 
strongly people may become involved.14 Involvement is
more likely and stronger as the “perceived value and/or 
threat” is higher and the “personal inconvenience costs”
of involvement is lower. Harbour et al focus on what
induces people to join “activist” campaigns against a 
possible environmental threat:14
• 
• 
• 
• 
Convince people that the environmental threat is high
and/or the value of their involvement in stopping the
threat is high.
Make it easy and painless to become involved.
Our objective is different but the concepts are the same.
To increase involvement in the decision rather than a 
campaign to stop a decision later (late-entry players):
Increase the value of their involvement by engaging
them early enough and openly enough that their
concerns enter the decision process.  Show that their 
involvement matters. Our generic set of values and
principles2 addresses these objectives.
Make it easy to become involved.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We doubt that existing decision analysis approaches
will be adequate to resolve and sustain intractable cleanup
and waste management decisions – those with very long
time scales.  Many current difficulties stem from past
decisions, which often looked acceptable at the time – at 
least to those involved. New approaches are needed, such
as the KONVERGENCE Model for Sustainable
Decisions.1,2 Only two strategies are potentially
sustainable. One, use solutions that are adaptable as
knowledge, values, and resources change.  Two, manage
the three universes to maximize the chance that a low-
adaptable solution remains in konvergence.
When neither reusable nor closed alternatives appear
likely to be and to remain in konvergence over the time
periods associated with a decision, consider adaptable
Risk
A
da
pt
ab
ili
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alternatives.  Where maximum adaptability is appropriate, 
a package approach is needed: 
• Progress in a step-wise adaptable fashion. Put the 
hazards/facility into a configuration where they are 
safe, at least temporarily, maintaining as much 
adaptability as possible. 
• Research better ways to cleanup (or at least reduce) 
the hazard, to possibly bring reusable alternatives 
into konvergence. 
• Improve understanding of multi-generational risks, to 
possibly bring closed alternatives into konvergence. 
We offer these further suggestions: 
(1) Minimize the chance of getting stuck at an 
intermediate point out of konvergence. 
(2) For intermediate points with a significant chance of 
being divergent, consider what might be necessary to 
move to a point in konvergence. 
(3) Assess how risk, cost, and other key parameters vary 
with time. 
(4) Consider adaptability as one of the desirable 
attributes to optimize, with cost, risk, etc. 
(5) Explicitly discuss the risk of being divergent at 
intermediate points, the level of adaptability, and 
tradeoffs among adaptability, risk, cost, etc. with 
those affected by the decision. 
Other suggestions regarding Yucca Mtn are broadly 
consistent with others’ suggestions5, 6, 12 and how we 
observe the debate evolving (more emphasis on learning 
from reversible waste emplacement, funding of ATW, 
reprocessing being considered, etc.).  We suggest putting 
more emphasis on having a network of staged decision 
points (maximizing adaptability) with multiple “end 
states”, rather than a single path toward a pre-defined end-
state, and on the need to plan to sustain konvergence. 
Similar adaptable networked approaches can and 
should be developed for high-hazard, long-duration, 
intractable cleanup sites. 
We recognize the potential ongoing cost and risk 
associated with adaptable solutions but this has to be 
weighed against the cost and risks of a “no action” 
stalemate, of premature reusable alternatives (if attempted 
with inadequate knowledge), and of premature closed 
alternatives (if we really do not know that long-term 
behavior will be acceptable). 
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